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THIS CASE SHOULD BE ANALYZED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF ORDINARY
NEGLIGENCE IMPLICATING THE "GENERAL DUTY OF DUE CARE FOR THE
CUSTOMERS OF RETAIL ESTABLISHMENTS"

Respondent persists in invoking irrelevant premises liability cases to support its
argument that Appellant asks the Court to adopt a new duty applicable to its negligence in
permitting an obviously excited, unrestrained, and out of control dog the freedom to jump upon
its elderly patron, the Appellant. However, the general duty of due care for the customers of
retail establishments is well established. A retailer has a duty to his guests or customers of
caring for their safety. Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316, 318, 882 P.2d 971,973 (Ct.
App. 1994). "Generally, "owners and occupiers ofland will be under a duty of ordinary care
under the circumstances towards invitees who come upon their premises." Harrison v. Taylor,
115 Idaho 588, 596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989), McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151
Idaho 280, 284, 255 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2011). In holding that the Idaho's Legislature abolished
the open and obvious danger doctrine when it passed Idaho's comparative negligence statute
(I.C. § 6-801), it noted:

Under an ordinary negligence standard of care, the owner or occupier of premises is not
held strictly liable for injuries to invitees who enter upon the property:
The duty not to be negligent is only a duty to take reasonable precautions against
risk of undue harm. Even if the possessor were to come under the ordinary rule of
negligence, therefore, he could always repel the obligation to take any precaution
he could show to be unreasonable and burdensome.
Shindurling, "The Law of Premises Liability-is a Reasonable Standard of Care
Unreasonable?" 13 Idaho L.Rev. 67 (1976) (citing 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts
at 1437 (1956» (emphasis in original).
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By removing the open and obvious danger bar we implement further the legislative
mandate compelled by I. C. § 6-801: "Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence ... "
(emphasis added). Issues involving the parties' negligence, if any, will normally be
considered and decided by the jury, which is as it should be:
We must either trust the jury or get rid of it. One cannot afford to sympathize for long
with the view that a legal system must carry the burden of fictitious and obscurantist
doctrine in order to keep vital issues away from that tribunal which was constituted to
decide them.
Hughes, "Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation," 68 Yale LJ. at
700 (1959).
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989).
Harrison and its progeny teach that ordinary negligence defines the standard of duty in
the ordinary case. Harrison's citation to Shindurling's article is particularly helpful in this case,
because it is doubtful that Respondent could establish that the precaution of keeping dogs out of
its stores would have been "unreasonable and burdensome" in light of the fact that the dog was
not permitted in the store given the requirements of the Idaho Food Code,l which if followed
would have precluded allowing the dog into the store:
Prohibiting Animals. (Pertinent parts)
(A) Except as specified in" (B) and (C) of this section, live animals may not be

allowed on the PREMISES ofaFOOD ESTABLISHMENT.
(B) Live animals may be allowed in the following situations if the contamination
offood; clean EQUIPMENT, UTENSILS, and LINENS; and unwrapped SINGLESERVICE and SINGLEUSE ARTICLES cannot result:

***
(2) Patrol dogs accompanying police or security officers in offices and
dining, sales, and storage areas, and sentry dogs running loose in outside fenced
areas;

1 Because the District Court implicitly held that violation of the Idaho Food Code was irrelevant, Appellant
hopes that this Court will address the Significance of an ordinance which, while admittedly insufficient to
warrant an instruction on negligence per se, is nevertheless relevant to rebutting a defense based on the
argument that taking measures to prevent injury would be "unreasonable and burdensome." The relevant
provisions of the Idaho Food Code are:
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(3) In areas that are not used for FOOD preparation and that are usually
open for customers, such as dining and sales areas, SERVICE ANIMALS that are
controlled by the disabled EMPLOYEE or PERSON, if a health or safety
HAZARD will not result from the presence or activities of the SERVICE
ANIMAL; ...
See, Appendix, Idaho Food Code (compilation ofIDAPA 16.02.19), defInition of "Food
Establishment" in Section 1-201.1O(B) (36) and "Prohibiting Animals" Section 6-501.115,
IDAPA adopted pursuant to IDAPA 16.02.19.000 and, Idaho Code $39-1603
The regulation distinguishes between 1) areas in which contamination can result (in
which no live animals are allowed), 2) areas in which food is not prepared but in which a health
or safety hazard may result (in which no live animals are allowed), and 3) areas in which food is
not prepared and in which a health or safety hazard will not result (in which only "service
animals" are allowed).
Indeed, Respondent claims that they were already voluntarily protecting customers from
unruly dogs:
Q Appreciate the clarification. Now, one of the things that you said with respect to

your own employees, the dogs had to be on a leash and they couldn't be unruly and that
was to protect the customers; is that correct?
A Protect everything, yeah, protect everything, the employees, customers and
merchandise, stuff in the store, yeah.

Wilson Depo. Pg. 37 Ln. 1-8, Cr. 000146.
Further, even if Respondent's argument that foreseeability is negated by an absense of
prior injuries caused by unruly dogs were not self-refuting, it is belied by recent authority from
this Court. In Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167,296 P.3d 373, (2013) the
Respondent argued that it needed a special duty rule because of the absence of prior injury:

Boise Baseball admits that at least for "seven seasons (, Mr. Rountree's] accident is the
only time a spectator has suffered a 'major' injury because of a foul ball" at Memorial
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Stadium. The rarity of these incidents weighs against crafting a special rule. There is no
history of accidents that we can look to, and draw from, to sensibly create a rule.
Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 173,296 P.3d 373,379 (2013).

Retail establishments are liable for boxes that fallon patrons, floors that are too slick or
wet, etc. There is nothing new about the duty to prevent foreseeable injury. Respondent argues
that it was essentially good for business to allow dogs in its establishment at Hyde Park, even
though other Stinker Stores had not allowed it, because it was near a park, "everybody did it,"
and if Respondent had prohibited it they would have been the real mean people." Wilson Depo.
Pg. 36 Ln. 9-16, Cr. 000146. Based upon Respondent's manager's testimony it is clear that it
foresaw the risk of unruly dogs, and that it voluntarily took action to prevent resulting injury,
even if it adopted lax measures to attract business.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF INJURY CAUSED BY UNRULY
DOGS WAS FORESEEN

Respondent argues that notwithstanding the fact that it foresaw the need to implement rules
for its employees regarding keeping unruly dogs not under the control of a leash out of its premises,
"It was not reasonably foreseeable that the dog in this case would cause injury to plaintiff." It is
undisputed that Respondent's Manager understood the dogs posed a risk of injuring people.2
Respondent's arguments for upholding summary judgment rely on a series entangled logical
fallacies. Respondent's Manager Suzie Wilson testified that Stinker Store had voluntarily
adopted rules regarding dogs, consistent with her admission that there that there is always a risk
that a dog can startle someone by barking or anything like that. 3 Specifically, it is undisputed

2

Id., Wilson Depo. Pg: 38 Ln: 10 -18. CR 146.

3 Id.,

Wilson Depo. Pg: 37 Ln: 9 - Pg: 38 Ln: 3. CR 146.
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that Respondent's manager Susie Wilson had advised its employees during the twelve years in
which she was manager prior to August 6th, 2011 to "Make [the customers] take their dogs
outside if they're uncontrollable, and especially if they're not on a leash."4 Clearly, Respondant
foresaw the dangers of unruly dogs, yet it argues that when its employee failed to follow its
safety rule, Appellant's resulting injuries were unforeseeable. The fallacy in this argument is so
transparent that its refutation requires no further elaboration.
Respondent's second argument is similarly fallacious. In essence, Respondent argues
that the apparent efficacy of its safety measures proves that they were unnecessary in this case.
Respondent argues that because millions of people frequent Respondent's stores each year, but
only two known incidents involving dogs have occurred, injuries by dogs are unfoerseeable. The
fact that the Respondent's precautions allegedly had previously proved effective in preventing
injuries such as those suffered by the Appellant is not evidence that adherence to Respondent's
voluntarily adopted rules was unnecessary in this case, or that Appellant's injury was
unforeseeable. To the contrary, it is confirmation of foreseeability and the consequences of
dereliction of duty.
In some ways, this case is analogous to McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho

305,308, 707 P.2d 416, 419 (1985) in which this Court affirmed the denial of summary
judgment allowing a plaintiff to proceed on a theory of negligent creation of a foreseeable risk of
harm, which does not require that the retailer to have actual or constructive knowledge of a
dangerous condition unless the moving party establishes that the condition (not the injury) is an
isolated occurrence.

4

Wilson Depo. Pg: 32 Ln: 15 to Pg: 33 Ln: 16. Emphasis supplied.
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In Tommerup, we distinguished the "isolated incident" situation from circumstances
where an alleged tortfeasor is charged with having actively created a foreseeable risk of
danger in its course of business, stating:
Appellants cite Jasko v. F. W Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 494 P.2d 839 (1972)
in support of this argument. That case, however, is readily distinguished on its
facts. In Jasko, the plaintiff was injured in the defendant's store when she slipped
on a slice of pizza which was on the terrazzo floor. An associate manager of the
store testified that 500-1000 individuals per day purchased one or more slices of
pizza at the pizza counter. There were no chairs or tables by the counter. Many
customers stood in the aisle and ate the pizza from the wax paper sheets upon
which they were served. When pizza was being consumed, porters "constantly"
swept up debris from the floor.
In reversing an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
Colorado Supreme Court held defendant's method of selling pizza was one which
led inescapably to such mishaps as that of the plaintiff, and in such a situation
conventional notice requirements (Le. actual or construction knowledge of the
specific condition) need not be met. The court there stated:

"The practice of extensive selling of slices of pizza on wax paper to
customers [to] consume it while standing creates the reasonable
probability that food would drop to the floor. Food on a terrazzo floor will
create a dangerous condition. In such a situation, notice to the proprietor
of the specific item on the floor need not be shown.... "
The court further stated:
"The mere presence of a slick or slippery spot on a floor does not in and of
itself establish negligence, for this condition may arise temporarily in any
place of business. [Citation omitted.] Nor does proof of a slippery floor,
without more, give rise to an inference that the proprietor had knowledge
of the condition. [Citation omitted.] But we are not dealing with an
isolated incident.' " Jasko v. F. W Woolworth Co., 494 P.2d at 840.
The facts of the instant case more closely approximate those.of Jasko, than those
of Tommerup. Certainly, the trial court could not have concluded as a matter of
law that the presence of the ice cream on the floor was merely an isolated
incident. Hence, it did not err in denying Safeway's motion for summary
judgment.

McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305, 308, 707 P.2d 416, 419 (1985).
Here, there is no argument that no other unruly dogs had been permitted in the store, or
that they had not previously been removed when it became apparent to Respondent's employees
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that they were out of control:

Q I want to talk to you a minute or two about your rules for your employees in the
Stinker store regarding dogs. Did you have rules that you had put in place A Yes.

Q -- to your employees regarding allowing dogs in the store prior to August 6th, 2011 ?
A Yes. From the beginning that I've been at that store, the dogs had to be on a leash
and they could not be unruly dogs. They had to be dogs that were controllable. We did
have some customers that I really made mad because I would not allow them to bring
their dogs into the store because they did not look controllable to me.

Wilson Depo. Pg. 32 Ln. 15 to Pg. 33 La 3, Cr. 000146.
THE ISSUE OF MORAL BLAME IS IRRELEVANT IN AN ORDINARY
NEGLIGENCE CASE

The issue of moral blame is a curious one if it is to be applied in an ordinary negligence
case, because generally speaking, it is reasonable to assume that either no moral blame attaches
to common law negligence, or it attaches to all acts and ommissions which are simply negligent,
and not reckless. Assuming that an injury caused by an item falling from a shelf or a slip on a
slippery floor is caused by ordinary negligence, ther is no moral blame Ullless one considers all
acts of carelessness to be immoral. If anyone holds such a view, it is Ulllikely that members of
this Court share it. Appellant submits that the balancing process employed by the Court is
unnecessary with respect to simple acts of active negligence on the part of a business serving the
public, and, therefore, the issue of moral blame is unecessary to the analysis in this case. The
general duty of a business owner to refrain from active neglignce is well settled. Every person, in
the conduct of his business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care to "prevent unreasonable,
foreseeable risks ofhann to others." Sharp v.

w.n Moore Jnc~, 118 Idaho 297,300, 796 P.2d

506,509 (1990); Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669,672 (1999). Surely, it
cannot be the intent of this Court that every fact situation involving active negligence on the part
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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of a business presents a new issue of law that must be analyzed under Turpin as a matter of law,
or that the application ogf the general concept of active negligence to unique facts constittues an
"extension of the law" requiring a Court to apply the Turpin analysis. Such a holding would
literally require this Court to entertain appeals in every factual scenario presented in the various
cases that come before Idaho's trial courts, for the reason that each new factual scenario requires
an extension of the law. For this reason, this Court has stated "We only engage in a balancing of
the harm in those rare situations when we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope
previously imposed, or when a duty has not previously been recognized." Rife v. Long, 127
Idaho 841, 846,908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995). It is sufficient for trial courts to recognize the general
duty to use due care under the circumstances in cases involving ordinary negligence in a business
context.
Respondent argues that the dog in question had been in the store before on many occasions
and had never caused a problem. "She had been in the store before, she had been a busy playful dog
and yet she had never jumped up on anyone before. Thus, Stinker Stores had no reason to ask
Defendant Fuller to remove her from the store this time. It simply was not foreseeable that she
would jump on the Plaintiff and cause injury." This conclusion is based on statements made without
sufficient foundation, as it is a generalization made by Respondent's manager apparently based on
hearsay, unless she witnessed every such occasion.
Furthermore, even this self-serving statement does not state that the dog never jumped up on
anyone on a previous occasion, but simply that it had never done so and caused injury. It is easily
conceivable that a friendly but unruly dog might jump up on people all of the time, and only cause
injury when it did so to a frail, elderly gentlemen. Appellant disagrees that this facthas any
significance whatsoever if it is advanced simply for the proposition that the absence of prior injury
necessarily compels the conclusion that the dog never jumped up on anyone, and never presented a
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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danger. Nevertheless, the statement raises a significant favorable inference-the benefit of which
has thus far been denied to the Appellant.
Animals, like humans, tend to be creatures of habit. It is probable that the dog behaved on
prior occasions similarly to the way it did on the occasion on which Appellant was injured. It
appears from the surveillance videos that the dog's owner, at least on this occasion, did not bother to
hold his leash, and that he was not sufficiently trained to refrain from jumping up on the counter. In
the absence of evidence of the contrary, there is no reason to believe that the dog behaved "better" on
prior occasions. In the final analysis, how the dog and its owner behaved on prior occasions is not
dispositive.
Table 1
EVIDENCE OF DOG'S BEHAVIOUR ON PRIOR VISITS TO THE STINKER STORE
OBSERVATIONS Dog held on leach
ON PRIOR
OCCASSIONS

Dog not held on leash

Dog jumping on
counter

Scenario # 1: Notice that dog is unruly
and not kept under control

Scenario #2: Notice that dog is unruly
and not kept under control

Dog not jumping
on counter

Scenario #3: No inference can be
drawn that dog will not become
unruly when leash not held

Scenario #4: Reasonable inference that
dog will not become unruly when not
under control of leash

Only in Scenario #4 is it reasonable to assume that the dog will not become unruly when his
leash is not held. But we need not speculate as to the nature of the prior conduct of the dog in
question, because Respondent's Brief supplies us with the necessary information:
On the date of the incident, Darma was acting in the typical way she usuaUy did, and that
behavior had not been cause to remove her or implicate the policies of the store manager on
prior occasions. Wilson Depo. at 40, 11. 17-21, CR 147. Respondent's Brie/at 14.
Ms. Wilson testified:
Q Okay, and at least in looking at the video, what I saw was the dog sort of jump up on the
counter and put his front paws up on the counter. Did you see that in the video?
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A Oh, yeah, he was an excited little dog -- yeah, big dog.

Q When you saw that in the video, was that a surprise to you?
A No.

Q That was typical of his behavior?
A

Yes.

Q

So you knew he was a dog that jumped up?

A Yes.

Wilson Depo. Pg. 40 Ln. 11-23, CR 000146.
In other words, Respondent admits that it had foreknowledge that it was typical for the dog
to jump up on the counter and on people prior to the occasion in question, but it denies that the dog
had previously caused injury. This is akin to an argument in a dram shop case that a patron had
previously appeared to be intoxicated, but had never been known to cause an accident.
Even assuming that competent evidence demonstrated Scenario #4 had characterized the vast
majority of the dog's prior visits to the store, once the dog demonstrated his unruliness by jumping
repeatedly on the counter-as demonstrated in the videos-it would at least arguably be
unreasonable to rely on the dog's prior behavior as an excuse for not requiring the dog's owner to
grab the leash and get the dog under control. In sum, the record does not demonstrate the dog's prior
visits to the store can be characterized as falling within Scenario #4, and even if it did, this would not
entitle Respondent's employee to ignore a clear change in the dog's customary behavior.
Respondent's argument on this point simply has no logical force, and, respectfully, the District
Court's finding that the injury was unforeseeable is similarly flawed.
Respondent argues that the Court's fmding of no duty was also supported by the District
Court's finding ''that the injury was not severe and was not close in connection between the conduct
because Mr. Braese did not appear injured and walked around the same before and after he was
bumped into the rack, and (3) this was not a case where there was a foreseeability of great harm. (CR
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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216)." This argument's force is blunted by the fact that there was clearly evidence ofinjury
contained in the record irrespective of the sanguinity of the District Court's view of the effect ofthe
dog jumping upon on Appellant derived from her view of the videos, and the fact that the District
Court's assessment of foreseeability invades the province of the jury.
One can assume that at least elderly jurors, who presumably exercise typical caution against
falls commensurate with their age, would not regard a large dog jumping up on them as free of risk.
It is common knowledge that in the elderly, particularly those with the osteoporosis that generally
attends aging, a fall can cause a hip fracture, which can often result in decline leading to death.
There is simply nothing in the record from which the District Court could have concluded as a matter
of law that 1) the store did not serve elderly patrons, or 2) that a dog jumping up on elderly patrons
could not cause them injury. At a minimum, a jury could reasonably conclude that the cashier
should have told the dog's owner to pick up the leash and hold him when an elderly man entered the
store, and that he should have desisted in exciting the dog by feeding it treats from behind the
counter.
CONCLUSION

This is a case that never should have been dismissed on summary judgment. Respondent
had a duty of ordinary care as a matter of law. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to
foreseeability in general, because it is undisputed that Respondent voluntarily took action to
guard against injury to patrons from unruly dogs. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether or not injury was foreseeable once the cashier saw the dog in question jumping up and
unrestrained by a leash. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the cashier
acted reasonably in not telling the dog owner to either get the dog under control or remove it
from the store in keeping with what the manager has testified was her practice. Summary
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judgment should be affirmed with instructions to the District Court to permit Plaintiff to
introduce evidence for a limited purpose of the Idaho Food Code's prohibition against having a
dog in the store, assuming a proper foundation, because it is relevant to the Defendant's claim
that it would be unreasonable and overly burdensome to have to take action to prevent its patrons
from having to encounter unruly ~nd potentially dangerous animals within its stores.
DATED: January 27, 2014.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Dated January 27, 2014.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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Will Breck Seiniger, Jr.
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APPENDIX

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
Division of Health
Office of Epidemiology and Food Protection
Boise, Idaho

INFORMATIONAL COPY

This copy of the IDAHO FOOD CODE is not the official copy of the rules as
they appear in the Idaho Administrative Code. This is a compilation of: 1) the
updated rules, IDAPA 16.02.19, and 2) the 2001 FOOD CODE, which is
adopted by reference in the rules and incorporated into this document.

ii

Chapter

Purpose and Definitions
Parts
1-1
1-2

1-1

TITLE, INTENT, SCOPE

IDAPA 16.02.19.100. PURPOSES AND DEFINITIONS.
Section 100-199 will be used for modifications and additions to Chapter 1 ofthe 2001 Food
Code as referenced in Section 004 of these rules.

1.1
These provisions shall be known as the Food Code, hereinafter referred to as "this Code."

o
The purpose of this Code is to safeguard public health and provide to
safe, unadulterated, and honestly presented.

CONSUMERS FOOD

that is

1

This Code establishes definitions; sets standards for management and personnel, FOOD
operations, and EQUIPMENT and facilities; and provides for FOOD ESTABLISHMENT plan review,
PERMIT issuance, inspection, EMPLOYEE RESTRICTION, and PERMIT suspension.

1-2

DEFINITIONS

(A) The following definitions apply in the interpretation and application ofthis Code. The
definitions shown as IDAPA 16.02.19.110 are modifications or additions to the definitions in the
2001 Food Code.
(B) Terms Defined.

(1) Accredited program.
(a) "Accredited program" means a food protection manager certification
program that has been evaluated and listed by an accrediting agency as
conforming to national standards for organizations that certify individuals.
(b)" Accredited program" refers to the certification process and is a designation
based upon an independent evaluation of factors such as the sponsor's mission;
organizational structure; staff resources; revenue sources; policies; public
information regarding program scope, eligibility requirements, re-certification,
discipline and grievance procedures; and test development and administration.
(c)" Accredited program" does not refer to training functions or educational
programs.

(2) Additive.
(a) "Food additive" has the meaning stated in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, § 201(s) and 21 CFR 170.
(b) "Color additive" has the meaning stated in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, § 201(t) and 21 CFR 70.

(3) "Adulterated" has the meaning stated in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
§ 402.

2

(31) Fish.
(a) "Fish" means fresh or saltwater finfish, crustaceans and other forms of
aquatic life (including alligator, frog, aquatic turtle, jellyfish, sea cucumber, and
sea urchin and the roe of such animals) other than birds or mammals, and all
mollusks, if such animal life is intended for human consumption.
(b) "Fish" includes an edible human FOOD product derived in whole or in part
from FISH, including FISH that have been processed in any manner.
(32) "Food" means a raw, cooked, or processed edible substance, ice, BEVERAGE, or
ingredient used or intended for use or for sale in whole or in part for human consumption,
or chewing gum.
(33) "Foodborne disease outbreak" means the occurrence of two or more cases of a
similar illness resulting from the ingestion of a common food.
(34) "Food-contact surface" means:
(a) A surface of EQUIPMENT or a UTENSIL with which FOOD normally comes into
contact; or
(b) A surface of EQUIPMENT or a UTENSIL from which FOOD may drain, drip, or
splash:
(i) Into a FOOD, or
(ii) Onto a surface normally in contact with FOOD.

(35) "Food employee" means an individual working with unpackaged FOOD,
EQUIPMENT or UTENSILS, or FOOD-CONTACT SURFACES.

FOOD

(36) Food Establishment.
(a) "Food establishment" means an operation that stores, prepares, packages,
serves, vends, or otherwise provides FOOD for human consumption:
(i) Such as a restaurant; satellite or catered feeding location; catering
operation if the operation provides FOOD directly to a CONSUMER or to a
conveyance used to transport people; market; vending location;
conveyance used to transport people; institution, or FOOD bank; and
(ii) That relinquishes possession of FOOD to a CONSUMER directly, or
indirectly through a delivery service such as home delivery of grocery
orders or restaurant takeout orders, or delivery service that is provided by
common carriers.
(b) "Food establishment" includes:
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(i) An element of the operation such as a transportation vehicle or a
central preparation facility that supplies a vending location or
satellite feeding location unless the vending or feeding location is
PERMITTED by the REGULATORY AUTHORITY; and
(ii) An operation that is conducted in a mobile, stationary,
temporary, or permanent facility or location; where consumption is
on or off the PREMISES; and regardless of whether there is a charge
for the FOOD.
(c) "Food establishment" does not include:
(i) An establishment that offers only prepackaged
not POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS;

FOODS

that are

(ii) A produce stand that only offers whole, uncut fresh fruits and
vegetables;
IDAPA 16.02.19.08 Modification to Section 1-20 1. 10(36)(c) by
deleting (iii).
(iv) A kitchen in a private home if only FOOD that is not
is prepared for sale or service at a
function such as a religious or charitable organization's bake sale
if allowed by LAW and if the CONSUMER is informed by a clearly
visible placard at the sales or service location that the FOOD is
prepared in a kitchen that is not subject to regulation and
inspection by the REGULATORY AUTHORITY;
POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS

(v) An area where FOOD that is prepared as specified in
Subparagraph (C)(iv) of this definition is sold or offeredfor human
consumption;

(vi) A kitchen in a private home, such as a small family day-care
provider; or a bed-and-breakfast operation that prepares and
offers FOOD to guests if the home is owner occupied, the number of
available guest bedrooms does not exceed 10, breakfast is the only
meal offered, the number ofguests served does not exceed 18, and
the CONSUMER is iriformed by statements contained in published
advertisements, mailed brochures, and placards posted at the
registration area that the FOOD is prepared in a kitchen that is not
regulated and inspected by the REGULATORY AUTHORITY; or
(vii) A private home that receives catered or home-delivered FOOD.
(37) Food Processing Plant.
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(A) Items that are unnecessary to the operation or maintenance of the establishment such
as EQUIPMENT that is nonfunctional or no longer used; and
(B) Litter.

(A) Except as specified in ,,(B) and (C) of this section, live animals may not be allowed
on the PREMISES of a FOOD ESTABLISHMENT.
(B) Live animals may be allowed in the following situations if the contamination offood;
clean EQUIPMENT, UTENSILS, and LINENS; and unwrapped SINGLE-SERVICE and SINGLEUSE ARTICLES can not result:
(1) Edible FISH or decorative FISH in aquariums, SHELLFISH or crustacea on ice or
under refrigeration, and SHELLFISH and crustacea in display tank systems;

(2) Patrol dogs accompanying police or security officers in offices and dining,
sales, and storage areas, and sentry dogs running loose in outside fenced areas;

(3) In areas that are not usedfor FOOD preparation and that are usually openfor
customers, such as dining and sales areas, SERVICE ANIMALS that are controlled
by the disabled EMPLOYEE or PERSON, if a health or safety HAZARD will not result
from the presence or activities of the SERVICE ANIMAL;
(4) Pets in the common dining areas of institutional care facilities such as nursing
homes, assisted living facilities, group homes, or residential care facilities at times
other than during meals if:
(a) Effective partitioning and self-closing doors separate the common
dining areas from FOOD storage or FOOD preparation areas,

(b) Condiments, EQUIPMENT, and UTENSILS are stored in enclosed cabinets
or removed from the common dining areas when pets are present, and
(c) Dining areas including tables, countertops, and similar surfaces are
effectively cleaned before the next meal service; and

(5) In areas that are not usedfor FOOD preparation, storage, sales, display, or
dining, in which there are caged animals or animals that are similarly confined,
such as in a variety store that sells pets or a tourist park that displays animals.
(C) Live or dead FISH bait may be stored if contamination of FOOD; clean EQUIPMENT,
and LINENS; and unwrapped SINGLE-SERVICE and SINGLE-USE ARTICLES can
not result.
UTENSILS,
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